By Jean-Jacques Laffont
Extra then only a textbook, A thought of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will consultant economists' learn on legislation for future years. It makes a tough and massive literature of the hot regulatory economics available to the common graduate pupil, whereas providing insights into the theoretical rules and stratagems no longer to be had in other places. in line with their pathbreaking paintings within the software of principal-agent thought to questions of rules, Laffont and Tirole strengthen an artificial technique, with a specific, notwithstanding no longer unique, concentrate on the legislation of typical monopolies corresponding to army contractors, application businesses, and transportation gurus. The book's transparent and logical association starts off with an creation that summarizes regulatory practices, recounts the heritage of proposal that resulted in the emergence of the hot regulatory economics, units up the elemental constitution of the version, and previews the industrial questions tackled within the subsequent seventeen chapters. The constitution of the version constructed within the introductory bankruptcy continues to be a similar all through next chapters, making sure either balance and consistency. The concluding bankruptcy discusses very important components for destiny paintings in regulatory economics. every one bankruptcy opens with a dialogue of the industrial matters, a casual description of the appropriate version, and an summary of the implications and instinct. It then develops the formal research, together with enough factors for people with little education in info economics or online game concept. Bibliographic notes offer a historic standpoint of advancements within the sector and an outline of complementary examine. precise proofs are given of all significant conclusions, making the e-book priceless as a resource of contemporary learn suggestions. there's a huge set of evaluation difficulties on the finish of the ebook. Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics at Université des Sciences Sociales in Toulouse the place Jean Tirole is medical Director on the Institut d'Economié Industrielle.
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Extra info for A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation
75-81), as in the Paris bus, trolley, and subway systems earlier in this century and in the dockyards in Britain. The assets of such franchises are government owned but privately managed. Franchise bidding among potential operators as well as incentive schemes lead to transfers between the government and regulated firms. 15. Another point worth noting is that the firm's reward for intermediate- and low-powered incentive schemes must depend on realized performance, and therefore transfers arc necessarily retrospective.
17. S. DOD were sometimes proportional to realized costs or to costs initially estimated by the firm. Little knowledge of incentive theory is required to understand why such schemes gave rise to perverse incentives: The firm is rewarded rather than penalized for raising its costs. A more current example of such perverse incentives is found in Germany, where pharmacists make more money, the more expensive the drugs they sell. , drugs purchased cheaply in one country and sold at a higher price in another) have a low market share in Germany (The Economist, July 6, 1991, p.
Another example, still in Germany, is given by the use of cost-plus-proportional fee contracts for German defense contractors (see Reichelstein 1990). 18. 36 Scherer (1964, p. 142); the rest involves hybrid contracts. 37 19. For instance, Scherer (1964, p. " Â < previous page next page > page_12 If you like this book, buy it! 20 Later in this book we will relate the theory to these observations about the low power of actual incentive schemes and about the differences in power along the life cycle and across technologies.
A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation by Jean-Jacques Laffont